were used and the shelling became as heavy as any delivered by the German Army during the entire war
in Europe.
The XX Corps rushed troop reinforcements, tanks, and tank destroyers across to strengthen the
tiny foothold against strong counterattacks spearheaded by heavy tanks. The small bridgehead was
maintained and the order was to hold at all costs.
During the next several days, these strong enemy efforts to recapture the bridge went on. At one
time, a tank loaded with explosives and surrounded with suicide troops raced towards the bridge in a
desperate attempt to blow it up the tank. The tank was knocked out by a direct hit from a tank destroyer
only a few hundred yards from its goal. The bridgehead expanded, but slowly, against a stubborn,
persistent resistance. A view city blocks of Fraulautern and several pillboxes were cleared and held by
the infantry.
When the heavy concentrations laid on the bridge area from the Siegfried line slackened to some
extent, the engineers made a more detailed examination of the bridge itself and found that large-scale
preparations had been made for its complete destruction. The importance attached to the heavy stone
structure by the German commanders, and their fear of a crossing by XX Corps was clearly revealed
when eight huge chambers 25 foot in depth, filled with TNT, were found to be built into the peers of the
bridge and carefully camouflaged as manhole covers. Over 6,000 pounds of explosives were removed.
The XX Corps now held firmly in its grasp a huge stone bridge over the Saar River capable of
withstanding the heaviest pounding of German artillery. Over it poured more of the powerful battle
teams of the Corps. From the bridgehead, XX Corps was in a position to carve a substantial segment out
of the menacing Seigfried Line, and to carry on its mission of wresting from the Germans the rich,
industrial region of the Saar.
By the 6th of December, XX Corps had two more bridgeheads across the Saar, one by the 95th
Division about 2,000 yards to the south of Ensdorf and the other in the 90th Division zone at Dillingen.
Neither of these bridgeheads was able to push through the heavy defenses of the Seigfried Line.
Pillboxes and entrenchments were profuse. There were 40 forts in one area of 1,000 square yards. The
belt, itself, was approximately three miles in depth including antitank obstacles on the forward edge.
And in the XX Corps zone there was a second line of greater depth 10 or 15 miles to the rear.
These were obvious reasons for the slow and painful expansion of the bridgeheads at this point.
The enemy artillery was accurate and for days no bridges could be completed. As a result no heavy
weapons or armor were used. On the 8th of December the Saar had risen 2 feet, restricting even more
that trickles of food and ammunition into the bridgeheads. The cold and damp of winter were soaking
into the bones of the soldiers, some of whom in these areas had to be carried to their weapons. P-47s
flew in the low ominous clouds of fog to drop medical supplies. There were no tactical missions.
Such was the front line situation early in December as the remnants of the once mighty fortress
system of Metz surrendered.
With most of the 5th Division still containing the forts there was little choice for the Germans
but to starve or get out. Various attempts at reconciling the Germans were rebuffed but on the 6th of
December Fort San Quentin finally surrendered. There were 22 officers, 635 enlisted men, and two
American soldiers held as prisoners. All were ravenous. The same day the 87th Division supplied relief
in this area and a 5th Division battalion motor-marched to Lauterbach to rejoin his regiment there.