General Walker, accompanied by a combat soldier of the Corps, presented the city with a framed
and decorated map showing the route of the XX Corps in its rapid advance across France resulting in the
liberation of Lorraine.
The Ardennes offensive had started six days earlier and the extent of the penetration was still
unknown to the citizens of Metz, who became fearful. However, the mere presence of the Corps
Commander for a few minutes serve to reassure them that Metz would not be given up.
On the 31st of December, the 160th Cavalry Group on the left flank of XV Corps to the south
had warning that an attack would be made on its left. The implications were that a penetration might be
effected between the XV and XX Corps. The 95th Division thus alerted followed developments closely.
On the request of the 106th Cavalry Group to Division Headquarters, the 5th Rangers was notified to be
prepared for instant movement. Later the entire 378th Infantry Regiment which was in Division Reserve
received warning orders. It was reported that the enemy had an estimated 2,000 troops with ample
artillery support. By this time the right flank of the 95th Division was exposed and penetration was
noted toward the rear.
Although the 106th Cavalry Group did not have the information nor the whereabouts of the
enemy, subsequent action by the 2nd Battalion, 387th Infantry Regiment, located and engaged
approximately 300 enemy troops in the town of Werbeln and unknown dispositions in Schaffhausen.
Both towns were cleared by the 2nd of January in better house-to-house fighting. The Cavalry Group
then took over the sector and the 95th Division returned to a normal defensive routine. This attack
seemed to be part of an over-all New Year's demonstration for Hitler in which all units in Germany were
to participate.
According to captured German prisoners, if these preliminary piecemeal attacks had been
successful, a drive approaching division size would have been made. Quick response by the 95th
Division had saved any undue action.
Passive defense was maintained from the 3rd to the 20th of January. It employed the use of
nightly reconnaissance patrols and attempted to keep the enemy guessing at feinted moves.
Captured prisoners of war in the Saarlautern bridgehead and an increase in patrol activity now
gave evidence that an attack might be expected soon. On the night of the 19th of January new prisoners
revealed that the attack would come before dawn.
Patrols began to infiltrate skillfully at 0500 hours so that surveillance of the enemy could be
maintained for the flushing-out to come with daylight.
Beginning at 0600 hrs and continuing until early afternoon, intense enemy artillery fire covered
the area. Following the initial barrage, troops were seen to move into the open streets and openly
advance toward XX Corps lines. Some moved out too soon and were caught in their own shelling. The
action of the attackers, exclusive of the patrols, was inept and prisoners were found who did not even
know their own companies. The whole attack lasted less than one hour and yet it indicated a changing
complexion of the German defenses.
Our patrols were also in action across the river and were keeping the Germans apprehensive.
This was the situation on the 28th of January when the 26th Division relieved and 95th Division for a
move north to Belgium.
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