Movement to forward assembly areas was complicated by the great number of units involved,
both division and Corps (all of whom had to move at night), coupled with the inadequate and poor road
net. The march table, after close coordination with Corps, was based on the movement of the division
on the nights of D-3/2 and D-2/1. As it developed the successive postponement of D-Day permitted the
scheduling of the move over a period of three nights.
The artillery displacing on the nights of 5-6 and 6-7 November was completely positioned by
daylight 7 November. This move, was accomplished without benefit of moon and under incessant rain
on slippery, narrow roads. The remainder of the division displaced on the night of 7-8 November, a
move of even greater difficulty. The distance involved being too great for marching, the displacement
was made by marching and shuttling and involved two round trips for the attached transportation. By
dawn 8 November, the division and all supporting elements had closed within the protective cover of
FORET de CATTENOM and the defilade area to the immediate rearward thereof.
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7 November had been a dark and rainy day and the target date was definitely set for 9 November.
And so, 8 November the initiation date for the XII Corps offensive to the south became a day of final
preparation and coordination for tomorrow’s assault. Artillery battalions registered skillfully with but
one gun per Battalion, prepared their final data. Communications were extended forward and laterally
through out the division area. Lower echelon commanders made their reconnaissance of routes of
approach and crossing areas and surveyed from a distance their far bank objectives. Personnel
concerned with traffic circulation and bridge control received final instructions and departed for their
post. In the early afternoon all men were briefed on the division mission, its importance to the Army
scheme and their individual parts in it.
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