THE DIVISION PREPARATION
With the closing of the 90th Division in its rear assembly area on 3 November began a period of
intense activity.
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Reconnaissance of the area of future operations were energetically published within the
limitations made necessary by security considerations. Artillery positions, engineer equipment parks,
infantry assembly areas, routes of approach to the river, crossing zones, and the road net were all
reconnoitered and/or chosen by small officer parties who moved as inconspicuously as possible without
divisional insignia on their clothing and in vehicles of the 3rd Cavalry Group. This sketchy
reconnaissance was not at all desirable but it was felt that the preservation of security regarding the
contemplated operations of the 90th Division and its point of impact outweighed the advantages
accruing from a more detailed survey of the attack zone. The supporting engineer battalions, upon
designation by Corps, were wedded with a 358th and 359th Infantry Regiments, chosen as the right and
left assault regiments respectively.
Training in basic assault boat technique from the infantry standpoint was given to each soldier
since battle casualties during the preceding 5 months had cut to a mere handful those former members of
the 90th who had had ample experience in river crossing operations. Simultaneously, infantry staff and
commanders planned to the last detail the composition of the boat waves and individual boat loadings,
this included the 357th Infantry which although earmarked to cross by foot bridges or rafts was
nonetheless prepared for the eventuality of an assault crossing. When the regiments departed from the
rear assembly area, each individual soldier knew his wave and boat number and his chief of party.
Further, supply at echelons prepared an operational plan and organization designed to maintain, and
provide evacuation for their regiments by assault boat and motorboat if vehicular ferries or bridges
failed.
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The supporting arms and services were equally busy. The Corps Engineer plan was modified
where necessary and integrated with that of the 90th Division. Steps were taken to stage forward
additional equipment reserves, DUKWS and accessory supplies to meet unforeseen contingencies. The
problems of signal communication were given careful consideration. In addition to a double tactical net,
an engineer and traffic control net were organized and linked laterally. The laying of wire to and within
the forward assembly area was carried out under cover of darkness for several nights prior to the target
date. Weighted cable was prepared beforehand to permit bridging of the river gaps away from projected
bridges. Realizing the unusual demands which would be placed on radio until such time adequate
bridging could be provided, stacks of batteries were accumulated. At the divisional level, supply
agencies were prepared for the movement of necessaries considerably further forward than normal to
allow unit echelons to concentrate their efforts forward of regimental dumps.
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The 90th’s crossing was phased to follow by one day a great air strike designed to neutralize the
major Metz forts and other critical areas in the attack zone, provided that air strike came by the 8th of
November, in any event, the assault was to take place by the 9th. The 5th and 6th of November were
days of heavy rain, thereby granting 48 valuable hours for continuation of preparation. At divisional
headquarters, loose ends were gradually tied together and with regimental plans firm, the field order was
issued 2200 hrs 6 November.
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