defensive areas had been designed for all-around and mutual support, and consequently, if properly
manned would present a serious obstacle, regardless of the direction of assault. The initial problem was
the METRICH GROUP, the northernmost of the strong points that commanded the river line as superbly
as did the KOENIGSMACHER fortifications. Further to the east the heights were even more
commanding, although not known to possess man-made fortifications. Still eastward, outside the
division zone of action lay the highest ground of all. Four axial roads lay within the division zone
traversing the valleys between the parallel ridges and providing at first glance, adequate
communications, but study soon indicated that their usefulness was seriously limited by their
geographical location since they would be commanded for considerable distances in rear of front lines
by enemy held side slope positions.
23
It was a requisite that the assault not only be initiated under cover of darkness but also that the
leading elements, disregarding unknown limitations on night attack, drive forward and secure by
daylight, a toehold on the foothills to deny to the enemy close observation of the crossing area. A
railway and Highway closely paralleling the river provided initial phase lines, but beyond this point
depended on the individual soldier and his leader. However desirable an encircling maneuver might be
on the right flank, the commanding position of the GROUP FORTIFIE de KOENIGSMACHER dictated
a frontal assault upon this stronghold. With bridging operations definitely limited by terrain obstacles to
the CATTENOM and GRAVISSE bridge sites, initiation of bridging operations was entirely dependent
upon the removal of the enemies close observation. And so from the start it was realized by all ranks
that ultimate success lay in the hands of the infantrymen’s ability and courage to attack prepared
fortifications, manned by an alert foe.
24
The division plan of attack was simple and sound and thoroughly prepared. To develop the
maximum strength at the earliest practicable moment, the assault was to be made with two regiments,
each with two battalions abreast. Three general crossing areas were possible, astride the town of
RETTEL, GRAVISSE-MALLING and CATTENOM respectively. The RETTEL area was disregarded
because of its proximity to the dominating ground along the German border east of the attack zone,
ground to which no troops could be diverted. Consequently, the left regiment was earmarked to cross in
the GRAVISSE-MALLING area and drive rapidly east and southeast to secure the ground parallel to the
east of the RETTEL-KERLING road. The right Regiment Crossing in the vicinity of CATTENOM was
to capture Koenigsmacher fortress with minimum force, simultaneously pushing the assault to secure a
lodgment on the high ground on the right of the division sector. Since the town of
KOENIGSMACHER, along the river, was squarely in the middle of the division zone, its inclusion
within the objective of either assault regiment would necessitate a divergent effort by that regiment
which would only serve to detract from the strength of their respective main effort. As a result
KOENIGSMACHER and the ground immediately adjacent thereto was boxed off as a no maneuver area
and turned over to the division artillery to neutralize until such time as the third regiment could mop up.
The third regiment initially held in reserve was to cross behind either of the assault regiments at the
earliest possible moment swing into action down the MAGINOT LINE ridge to complete and solidify
the bridgehead.
A Corps engineer battalion was to support each of the assault regiments and subsequently
provide the necessary bridging while the divisional engineer battalion was kept intact for assault
operations with the infantry in general and engineer work on the far shore.
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