enemy. The 4th and 6th Armored Divisions of XII Corps were also being assembled further south in the
vicinity of Pont-a-Mousson. It was believed by the XII Corps Commander that if the 10th Armored
Division were put in the same locality the enemy would assume that a concentration of armor was to be
employed in the drive south and east of Metz, a deceptive move which battle experience later proved
successful.
During this period of relative quiet the enemy commanders had ample time to consider the
strategic value of the Metz system and to organize their defenses. Four German divisions, numbering in
all 30,000 troops, were holding Metz in the Moselle River line. On the north, the 416th Infantry
Division with a strength estimated that 8300 men, held the sector from Koenigsmacher to the northern
boundary of the XX Corps. The 19th Infantry Division, with a strength of more than 5000 troops, held
the Moselle sector from Koenigsmacher south to within five miles of Metz. This division with its
officer candidate school personnel and special Fortress troops, had a strength of approximately 9000
men. South of Metz was the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division, numbering approximately 6000 men.
Other General Headquarters units, such as flak and artillery battalions, totaling 2000 men, were scattered
throughout the area.
Generalleutnant Kittel, an expert in Fortress defense, was brought from the Eastern front to take
command of the 462nd Volksgrenadier Division. He did not arrive in Metz until the operation had
begun, and then only could dispose his units to meet the attack and give orders to defend at all costs.
The enemy, at this time, held only one small pocket across the Moselle in the northern portion of
the XX Corps zone. This pocket was held by three enemy companies in the town of Berg and on the
high slopes directly northwest of it. Presence of the enemy at Berg precluded a surprise attack in the
Koenigsmacher area. The 3rd Cavalry Group, commanded by Colonel James U. Polk, which was
patrolling in this area, was ordered by XX Corps on November 4 to wipe out this pocket.
The initial assault was made in the early morning darkness of the 5th of November by a small
armored-infantry team. This team penetrated the minefield that blocked entrance to the town of Berg
and drove the enemy defenders back across the Moselle. This action isolated the remaining enemy
company on the slope to the northwest of the town. Artillery concentrations on the slope paved the way
for an attack by a small force of dismounted cavalry which captured the enemy and occupied the hill.
This cleared the stage for the assembling of XX Corps units behind Cattenom prior to the attack.
The Commanding General of XX Corps Artillery, Brigadier General Julius A. Slack, had 18 2\3
field artillery battalions available to supplement the normal division artillery, plus the eight 100 mm
French guns of the captured fortress Guentrange and captured German ordnance.
Because the two areas of initial assault for the encirclement of Metz were separated by 40 to 45
miles, the Headquarters Battery was placed in charge of XX Corps Artillery which was disposed to
support the attack of the 5th Infantry Division in the southern bridgehead. The XX Corps artillery
allocated its 18 2/3 Field artillery battalions to support the 90th Infantry Division attack. One field
artillery group in the field artillery battalion, manning captured enemy guns, reinforced the 95th Infantry
Division in the area selected for its demonstration in force in the vicinity of Uckange.
Security was of paramount importance in the movement of XX Corps artillery to the new
position areas. Deceptive measures were adopted. Artillery, remaining in the old positions, increased
the rate of fire to match the volume normally fired by all the artillery. Radios and observation posts
 |
 |
 |