Moselle triangle and seize a bridgehead on the Saar River at Saarburg. The 83rd Infantry Division was
to be attached to XX Corps for this mission. Saarburg was the weakest part of the Siegfried line in the
XX Corps zone of advance to the east. Interrogation of prisoners of war indicated that this particular
region was lightly held by the enemy. The execution of the second operation was timed to coincide with
the encirclement of Metz.
The Metz operational plan directed the 5th Infantry Division to attack on the south from the
Arnaville bridgehead, bypass the outer belt of fortresses, bridge the Nied River and attack north to seize
the high ground southeast of Boulay.
The XX Corps Commander directed the 90th Infantry Division to make an assault crossing over
the Moselle River on the north, execute a flanking attack along the trace of the Maginot Line, and join
up with the 5th Infantry Division behind Metz in the vicinity of Boulay. By attacking along the ridge
line containing the Maginot Forts, commanding ground would be held during the advance and the forts
could be enfiladed, if necessary, one at a time without having the assault troops subjected to supporting
cross fires of this fortified line.
General Walker, after making a personal reconnaissance of the northern portion of the XX Corps
zone, selected the area between Malling and Cattenom for the 90th Infantry Division crossing site. This
division would first reduce Fort Koenigsmacher and then establish a bridgehead over the Moselle in this
area. The 10th Armored Division would be passed through the Koenigsmacher bridgehead and attack
southeast to Boulay, at the rear of the Metz fortified region, on the outside of the 90th Infantry Division,
after these two divisions had swept forward on their assigned mission, the 83rd Infantry Division would
be passed over at the same place and dispatched on its concurrent mission to the northeast. The 90th
Infantry Division was to link up with the 5th Infantry Division south of Boulay and thus complete the
encirclement of fortress Metz.
It was believed, from the available intelligence, that the River line opposite Thionville was
heavily defended by the enemy. Further south at Uckange there was an excellent crossing site. This
was the logical place for a river crossing and it was thought that the enemy would be set for an attack in
this area. With these considerations in mind, General Walker ordered a battalion of the 95th Infantry
Division to make a demonstration in force at Uckange in order to distract the enemy's attention from the
main effort of the 90th Infantry Division at Koenigsmacher.
The remainder of the 95th Division would be disposed to contain the German fortified salient
west of Metz. The Division would maintain constant pressure along that defensive perimeter until the
encirclement had been accomplished or until a weak spot developed there. Then, on the Corps
Commander's order, the 95th Infantry Division was to advance and capture the city of Metz.
Prior to the river crossing, the 3rd Cavalry Group would screen the Moselle River line north of
Thionville and cover the readjustment of the troops. After the bridgehead had been established, the
cavalry would follow the 10th Armored Division across to join the main effort to the south. The cavalry
would then guard the north flank of the XX Corps.
D-day was set for the ninth of November 1944. The intervening two week period was to be used
in training troops for the assault of fortified positions and in the regrouping units.
The 10th Armored Division was placed along the southern perimeter of the German salient quest
of the Moselle. This was done not only to give the Division battle indoctrination, but also to confuse the
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