THE MACHINE GUN BARRAGE
TO this brief exposition of the infantry action of November 1 and 2 must now be added an account of the
part played by machine guns and artillery. The machine guns will be reviewed first. The most notable
thing about their use was the manner in which the 345th Machine Gun Battalion supported the advance
of the infantry by direct overhead fire. The terrain was particularly adapted for effective barrage fire,
and the degree of success with which Major H. R. Kimberling, brigade machine gun officer, exploited
this opportunity established the action as one of the most successful machine gun operations ever
attempted on any front.
Companies A and B, 345th Machine Gun Battalion, under command of Captain H. B. Irwin,
were sited in the Bois des Rappes, covering the ravines over which the 359th Infantry was to advance;
and Companies C and D, commanded by Captain Louis L. Chatkin, were in the northern edge of the
Bois de Bantheville, from which position they could neutralize the edge of the Bois d’Andevanne as
well as the positions around the town of Andevanne itself.
Perhaps it will convey some faint idea of the activity of these barrage guns to state that they fired
a total of approximately a million and a quarter rounds of ammunition. Nor were these bullets wasted.
The greater part of this fire was observed, and a German officer captured the first day testified that it
was the most intense machine gun fire he had ever witnessed. The guns also received credit for
silencing two batteries of enemy artillery – a very unusual feat. About 11 A. M. November 1, a battery
of artillery was located in the triangular woods just east of Chassogne Farm, and Major Kimberling
directed twelve guns on this spot for twenty minutes, with the result that the battery ceased to trouble us.
A short time later an observer in the Bois des Rappes saw the Germans trying to get their guns out of the
woods. Fire was again opened. After the woods were captured, the artillery pieces were found. The
sides of the horses which were hitched to the caissons were riddled with bullets. About 1 P. M. another
battery was silenced near the Bois de Babiemont,
Companies C and B fired from 5:30 to 7: 30 A. M., and then moved forward to join the infantry.
The guns in the Bois des Rappes, however, continued firing for a period of nine and a half hours on
November 1 without stopping. Again, on the morning of November 2, these same guns fired for forty-
five minutes on targets in the sector of the 359th Infantry, at a range of approximately 3000 meters, with
good effect.
This wonderful result was achieved at the expense of only four men killed and twenty-one
wounded. The slight casualties were due to the precautions which Major Kimberling took to have all
men dig in properly before the action opened. The major assembled not only his officers, but his section
leaders as well, at his headquarters at Nantillois several days before the attack, and there he explained in
detail everything that was to be done. A model trench and machine gun emplacement, with section belt
refilling station, had been dug at Nantillois. On the night of October 28 the men began digging similar
emplacements for their barrage positions. During the daytime the range to all conceivable targets was
taken, the compass bearings obtained, and charts made for each gun in order that all guns might be
directed on the same target at a minute’s notice, if it should be so desired.
The gunners who fired with such marvelous accuracy on November 1 had been without sleep for
several days and nights. In addition to the work involved in digging in, there was an immense amount
of ammunition to be carried forward from the dumps to the guns. The left group of gunners, in the Bois
de Bantheville, were forced to carry 300,000 rounds from trucks which became stalled south of
Bantheville.
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