FIELD ORDER No. 13
THE plan of attack for the Division, which was issued as Field Order No. 13 – lucky number! – was
generally as follows:
The 90th Division, as at St. Mihiel, was on the right flank of the 1st Army attack. On our left
was the 5th Corps, which by a direct drive was to seize the ridge of the Bois de Barricourt and the
heights northeast of Bayonville, thus effecting a complete rupture of the enemy’s main line of resistance
the first day. The 5th Division – the other front line division of the 3d Corps – was to hold on our right,
merely sending out patrols to reconnoiter the Bois de Babiemont and Côte 261, the only two spots of
possible danger in their front. These two points were on the brink of a huge basin, in the center of which
was a small elevation called 216. The town of Doulcon is located in this “punch bowl.” The wooded
heights north of the “punch bowl,” known as Bois de Sassey, were to be saturated with “yellow cross”
gas so as to eliminate any danger from that flank.
The principal mission of the 90th Division on the first day of the general attack was to capture
the wooded ridge along the left boundary of the Division. The 360th Infantry was assigned this task. To
their right the 359th Infantry was to attack northeast across Cheline and Etaillon ravines, covering the
flank of the 360th Infantry. The front of the 360th Infantry was made very narrow, and the infantry
attack was to be supported powerfully by a deep rolling barrage of four waves, in addition to gas,
smoke, and overhead machine gun fire, in order that the mission of the regiment might be accomplished
as speedily as possible. As has been pointed out in the description of the terrain, the Andevanne ridge
dominated the open space which the 359th was to cross; hence that regiment’s advance must follow the
neutralization of the woods to the left. Furthermore, the possession of this ridge would facilitate the
advance of the 89th Division on our left.
The first day’s attack was divided into two phases. There was an intermediate objective – Hills
300 and 278 and Cheline Ravine – which all troops were scheduled to reach by two hours and a half
after H hour, and where all units were to halt, catch their breath, and start off afresh. Then there was the
corps objective, the final objective for the day, which included the heights north and northeast of
Andevanne and the ridge running southeast from Andevanne to Croix St. Mouclen, a point one
kilometer west of Aincreville. Nothing was left to chance. The exact rate of advance, with varying
speed limits across the open, up the hills, and through the woods, was set forth in orders, and the exact
position of every unit throughout the attack was planned in advance. On the second day, however, there
was no “set piece,” but merely an “exploitation”; that is, on November 2 each organization was to
advance as far as local successes and the nature of enemy resistance on their front would permit.
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