TEXAS BRIGADE BREAKS FREYA STELLUNG
PRIOR to arriving at a decision as to the best manner of attack, any commander, from a corporal leading
a squad to General Pershing himself, must study all the factors affecting his own and the enemy forces.
This mental process is described in Field Service Regulations – the Bible of the soldier – as an “estimate
of the situation.” In order, then, to understand the plan of attack of November 1 it will be necessary for
the reader to make such an estimate. Under the head of our own forces, it suffices to say that when the
180th Brigade jumped off on November 1 its strength was only at 50 per cent, of its officers and 65 per
cent of its enlisted personnel. The headings which will require explanation are: the terrain, the
organization of that terrain by the Germans for defense, and the intentions of the enemy – that is,
whether or not the Germans planned to hold their present positions or were merely fighting a rear-guard
action preparatory to a general retirement.
First, then, must be understood the terrain over which the advance was to be made. The principal
feature on the immediate front of the Division was the wooded ridge running north along the left
boundary – that is, roughly speaking, between Grand Carré Farm and the heights north of Andevanne.
From this high ground there was an open slope toward the Meuse. This open ground was cut on the
front of the 90th Division into three ridges, and by two ravines which flowed in a southeasterly direction
into the Andon brook. The highest point of the region was a heavily wooded hill known as Côte 243,
which was just west of Villers-devant-Dun and linked up with the wooded ridge along the left boundary.
Sloping north from Côte 243 was a relatively open space of an average width of two kilometers
before entering the dense Bois de TailIy, Bois de Montigny, Bois de Mont, and Bois de Sassey. The
first two woods, which formed a continuous forest, were separated from the last-named two woods by a
deep ravine, along which ran the Villers-Montigny road. The northeastern edge of this wooded area
marked the crest of a high bluff. From the foot of these bluffs to the Meuse the country was flat and
open.
As to the organization of the terrain by the enemy, suffice it to say that on November 1 the 90th
Division held a line opposite the Freya Stellung. This defensive position, which the Germans relied
upon to hold the American attacks, and was organized in depth to include a first or covering position
between Aincreville and Grand Carré Farm, and, secondly, the main line of resistance, which embraced
Andevanne, Côte243, and Villers-devant-Dun. And it was manned with troops rated among the best in
the German army. The enemy order of battle, at the beginning of the operation, was, from west to east,
88th Division, 28th Division, and 107th Division. “The Kaiser’s Favorite” held most of the sector, but
there were elements of the 88th and 107th Divisions on the flanks.
As the operations in the Meuse-Argonne region shaded into what is popularly known as “open
warfare,” as compared with “trench warfare” and “warfare of position,” there was not to be found on
this front the maze of trenches and entanglements, such as faced the Division at St. Mihiel. The
artificial defenses consisted for the most part of pits for machine gunners and “fox-holes,” The latter are
individual pits dug at scattered intervals so as to afford the maximum protection from shell fire. There
was some wire, particularly on Côte 243, but the enemy relied principally upon machine guns, concealed
in woods, holes, and isolated farms or villages, to bar the way.
Practically all of the above information was known by General McAlexander before he was
called upon to make his decision as to the manner in which the attack would be made. This information
was supplied by the second section of the General Staff. The story of the life of the Boche, his home
and his habits, had been pieced together by Lieutenant-Colonel H. C. Tatum and the regimental and
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