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ON the morning of September 16 General Allen ordered out daylight patrols with a view to
reconnoitering the Hindenburg line.  Very little headway was made, machine gun fire being encountered
very soon after leaving our lines.  After dark, however, the Germans withdrew their more advanced
outposts, and during the night the 360th reached a point about 300 meters southwest of Pagny-sur-
Moselle, while a patrol led by Lieutenant Floyd G. Betts, regimental scout officer of the 358th Infantry,
surrounded Preny.  Later on, however, the Germans strengthened their outposts in front of Pagny and
Preny and along the camouflaged road running southwest from Preny.
This reconnaissance of the Hindenburg line was the finale of the forward movement.  From that
time on, efforts were devoted to the organization of the sector.  On September 16 Colonel Hartmann
moved his P. C. to a comfortable German dugout in the Stumpflager.  Captain Thomas B. Smith, a
graduate of the third class of the General Staff College at Langres, who had been assigned to the 90th
Division, joined the 357th Infantry the same day, and served as acting operations officer through the
remainder of the war.
Colonel Leary had moved his P. C. on the second day of the fighting to old German dugouts in
the valley in the heart of Bois de Friere, along the roadway from Fey-en-Haye to the Stumpflager. 
Colonel Price remained at Le Petant Farm, and Colonel Sterling established his P. C. in the Bois-le-
Pretre along the Fey-en-Haye-Norroy road.  The Division P. C. moved back to Villers-en-Haye on
September 17.
The P. C. of the 179th Brigade, which had been in a dugout on Tranchée de Cri Cri since
September 14, moved to Mamey, and the P. C. of the 180th Brigade was established at Champ Clos in
the suburbs of Pont-
Going forward with the infantry and machine guns, and suffering the same hardships and
dangers, were many special troops which played no small part in bringing about the success of the
American troops.  For example, the signal platoons of the regiments, which, in conjunction with details
from the Outpost Company of the 315th Field Signal Battalion, maintained telephonic communication
with battalion commanders despite the shelling which constantly chopped their wires, earned the praise
received from all commanders.  The trench mortar and 37 mm, platoons of the regimental headquarters
companies, too, worked faithfully and were always prepared for any emergency, although the
opportunity did not come for spectacular service.  Owing to the weight of the mortars and the guns, the
difficulty of carrying these weapons and a sufficient supply of ammunition was so great that there was
not time to call them into action in an operation in which the infantry was rushing forward at the
maximum speed in order to keep up with the barrage.  In addition, in wooded country such as existed in
the division sector, it was difficult to get sufficiently definite targets.
Too much credit cannot be given the wagoners of the regimental supply companies, who kept
close on the heels of the fast advancing infantrymen with rolling kitchens, ration carts, and water carts. 
No division in the American Expeditionary Forces made a better record in getting hot food up to the
men immediately after the fight.  This was achieved in spite of the condition of the roads.  No less
important was the hauling forward of munitions.  These achievements are noteworthy when it is recalled
that both horses and drivers were frequently killed.
In no class of men was a stoical disregard for danger and hardship more evident than in the
attitude of these drivers, the majority of whom had grown to manhood on the plains and stock farms of
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