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BUT the operations were by no means completed by the cutting off of this slice of Bocheland.  The same
corps field orders which felicitated the troops on the victory contained this second paragraph: 
“The first phase is now completed.  The next step is to organize the line attained for permanent
occupancy.  This means that the outpost line must he pushed two kilometers in front of the line being
fortified and a whole position occupied in depth.  This outpost must be established before morning,
September 13, and the line of resistance completely laid out and the trenches dug.  This position must he
held against all attacks of the enemy.”
  The attack is only half the battle: the modern soldier must know how to wield a spade as well as
shoot a gun.  There was no chance for rest after the wearying combat of the day.  Every one was
immediately put to work digging trenches along the line of the first day’s objective, which was to be the
main line of resistance of the new position.  In addition, there was further fighting to be done in
establishing the outpost two kilometers beyond the point which had been reached during the first day.
The difficulties encountered in fullfilling this last mission are illustrated by the experience of
Lieutenant Bryan N. Mudgett, Company A, 357th Infantry.  He succeeded in going more than a
kilometer, but in doing so had slipped through the German lines and was completely surrounded.  With a
command of only two squads, he attacked and captured a battery, together with the non-commissioned
officer in charge and seven of the crew.  He fought his way hack toward the American lines, losing only
one of the prisoners, until he met the 3d Battalion of his regiment moving forward the next morning.  On
September 23 Lieutenant Mudgett received a mortal wound from artillery fire while on duty in the
locality of this exploit.
Owing to the wooded nature of the terrain, and the fact that the infantry was rushed forward with
maximum speed, the machine gun organizations had little opportunity to get into the action.  In the
179th Brigade, the guns had been disposed as follows: the 357th Machine Gun Company was with the
1st Battalion of its regiment; the 358th Machine Gun Company was with the 2d Battalion, and the
companies of the 344th Machine Gun Battalion were assigned in this manner: Company A to 2d
Battalion, 357th Infantry; Company B, part to 3d Battalion and part to 1st Battalion, 357th Infantry;
Company C, to 1st Battalion, 358th Infantry; and Company D to 3d Battalion, 358th Infantry.  In the
180th Brigade the assault battalions of the 359th and 360th Infantry were supported by their respective
regimental machine gun companies, and the 345th Machine Gun Battalion was disposed as follows: one
company to the support battalion, 359th Infantry; one company to the 3d Battalion, 360th Infantry: and
the remaining two companies in brigade reserve.
The machine guns were used in organizing the line of resistance.  A counter- attack was feared
the night of September 12-13, and the guns of the support battalions were moved forward to the main
line, where part of them remained for defense during the remainder of the Division’s occupancy of the
St. Mihiel sector.
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