In the next phase of the attack – the establishment of the new regimental line in the Bois
de Chenaux and on Hill 327 – some of the heaviest fighting in the entire of scene and visualized
the obstacles in the path of the advance. In a letter to the commander in chief of the American
Expeditionary Forces. General McAlexander declared, in part:
“Colonel H. C. Price … has the equal of any regiment in the A. E. F. in morale, in harmony
and efficiency. … In the St. Mihiel salient action of September 12, 1918, his regiment gained its
objective ahead of schedule time. The army objective did not include the notorious Bois le
Pretre, owing, as I am informed to a report mode by the French – in fact, by Marshal Petain –
that the wood was regarded as invulnerable. … On the morning of September 13 Colonel Price
went into the Bois le Pretre and before the day was over had cleared it of the enemy, who had
held it for four years. The fighting in this wood had in four years cost the French one hundred
and twenty-three thousand casualties, of whom eighteen thousand were killed. It was only
through the energy and splendid leadership of Colonel H. C. Price that the capture of this wood
was made possible.”
With characteristic fairness Colonel Price does not permit the assumption that the German
resistance was as strong at the time of the capture of the wood as it had been when the French
assaulted in vain. In an official report he declares:
“It is not intended to convey the idea that the defense encountered at the time the 360th
Infantry attacked the Bois le Pretre is comparable to that shown by the Germans against the
French in previous engagements and attacks. But, nevertheless, the fact remains that the 360th
Infantry attacked in a maze of woods, barbed wire, trenches and shell torn area and cleared the
Bois le Pretre of an enemy who had held it so long and so well.”
In the next phase of the attack – the establishment of the new regimental line in the Bois
de Chenaux and on Hill 327 – some of the heaviest fighting in the entire offensive fell to the lot
of the first battalion and to platoon-strong patrols from all other companies. Major Morris’ four
companies were slated to attack the entire line, from the hill on the right across the saddle and
into the woods on the left, on the morning of September 15. The advance was to be covered by
the patrols from the other battalions, which were sent out on the night of the 14th. These patrols
met with varying success. The one from Company I , commanded by First Lt. Joseph S. Barnett,
so well performed its perilous mission that by 11 o’clock that night it had firmly established
itself in some German trenches on the southern slope of the hill. From this position Lieutenant
Barnett and his men commanded a part of the objective and greatly facilitated the approach of
the first battalion the next morning. To reach this vantage post the patrol had to brush
continually with the enemy. More than one occupied enemy machine gun nest laws cleared by
men like Sergeants Cephus Clark and “Cap” Morse, who killed or captured the crews and then
turned the guns to good advantage covering the advance of the remainder of the men. Second
Lieutenant Earl V. Cliff, at the head of Company K’s patrol, also reached the hill, surprising a
machine gun nest on the way and killing part of the crew. Second Lieutenant Vernon D. Hart
died leading the men from M company forward, and First Lieutenant John B. Chamberlain and
several men of the patrol from Company L were wounded. But under charge of non-
commissioned leaders these patrols forged ahead until forced to dig in by overwhelming enemy
fire. The command of Company L’s patrol was passed on three times, as both Sergeant Louis
Corehan and Sergeant Kraft, who succeeded Lieutenant Chamberlain, were hit. Daybreak found
Corporal Davis calmly direct in the reconnaissance. To the left of patrols from the second
Battalion pushed ahead gallantly until it became humanly impossible to advance. Then they
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