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11
CHAPTER THREE -THE FORET DE MONT CASTRE
On the afternoon of 10 July 1944, this Battalion, which had been occupying a defensive position
in the northern edge of the Foret De Mont Castre, was ordered to attack at 1400 to the southeast.  The
strength of the three rifle companies was at that time 434 men and 13 officers.  The 3rd Battalion, 359th
Inf. was on this Battalion's right flank while the 2nd Battalion 359 Inf. was on the left.  The Battalion
crossed its LD promptly at 1400 with Company I on the left guiding on a long fire break, Company L on
the right, and Company K in reserve moving behind Company I.  The Bn. Command Group, consisting
of Lt. Col. Bealke, Capt. John W. Marsh, and seven enlisted men, moved behind the left platoon of
Company L.  The LD was crossed without any artillery preparation.
An advance of approximately 600 yards was made before any resistance was encountered. 
Terrain within the Battalion's zone was initially a hillside gently sloping from northeast to southwest. 
The landscape was covered [with a] thick dense growth of plants and tangled vines, almost jungle-like in
appearance.  Visibility was limited to between five and 25 yards.  No roads existed, but one trail ran
down the forest parallel to the Battalion direction of advance.  Company I guided on this trail.  The two
assault Companies were each advancing in formation of two platoons as skirmishers and one platoon in
column to the center rear.  In this formation they advanced beating out the thickets, with contact being
extremely difficult to maintain due to the dense undergrowth.
At approximately 1500, Lt. Col. Bealke halted the Battalion in order to regain contact and
determine the Companies exact locations.  At that time, all of I Company's platoons were in contact with
each other as well as the left platoon of L Company.  However, the two remaining rifle platoons and the
weapons platoon of L Co. were back to the right rear somewhere in the thicket and temporarily out of
contact.  Company K was likewise out of contact except by SCR 300 radio.
Consequently, the Battalion was halted and Lt. Col. Bealke then requested artillery to fire a
purple smoke shell on a concentration number which was believed to be close by.  He adjusted the fire
until it was immediately in front of the Battalion and then asked the artillery for the coordinates of the
last round.  Since visibility during the entire advance had been but between five and 25 yards , it was
only by this means that the Battalion Commander found his exact location.  In the meantime the
Companies had regained contact and the advance was resumed.
Shortly thereafter, Company I ran into a German position located behind a rocky hill 25 feet
high.  The Company was at this time proceeding through thick tangled brush and had a visibility of
about five to 15 yards.  Suddenly, about ten hand grenades were hurled over the brush and landed in the
vicinity of the two assault platoons, causing heavy casualties.  Company I's light machine gun section
was practicably wiped out by this attack.  At the same time, fire from several German machine guns
sprayed through the brush, pinning the entire Company to the ground.  Even then, because of the dense
undergrowth, the platoon scouts could not see the enemy who could not have been more than twenty
yards from them.
Pfc. William L. Smiley, of Company I, alone and on his own initiative, crawled forward 20 yards
through the undergrowth , scaled the rocky hill and fired several shots over the hill before he was
mortally wounded.  Pfc. Theodore Wagner (now 2nd Lt.) of Company I, then followed Smiley's
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