7.
COMMUNICATION
Maximum use was made of all communication throughout the entire operation. Coordination between the tanks and
infantry was limited because of the type of communication in use at that time. Communication between the forward elements
and those units supporting them by fire made possible the maximum employment of indirect fire weapons.
8.
USE OF SUPPORTING FIRES
Supporting fires were available and wisely employed, therefore they could be considered a deciding factor in the
attack. The employment of the direct fire weapons from forward positions not normally considered as position areas for
that type weapon, (machine guns) assisted materially during and following the assault of the bridge at MAYENNE. Due to
the fact the Artillery Liaison Officer was well forward and aggressively employed artillery fire, its impact was timely and
accurate.
9.
FAILURE TO DEMOLISH BRIDGE
After entering the city of MAYENNE the amount of enemy resistance encountered indicated that the enemy
intended to defend that city. That bridge had been prepared for demolition. Failure to demolish the bridge indicated that the
enemy's plan of defense had not included plans and instructions in detail to destroy a key approach to their otherwise planned
defense of MAYENNE.
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