ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM
1.
ASSIGNMENT OF MISSIONS
The passage of the U.S. VIII and XV Corps through the narrow AVRANCHES axis of advance to the south,
constituted a daring assumption of the initiative on the part of the Third U.S. Army Commander.
The resultant success of such initiative was relayed through all channels of command to the extent that all
subordinate commands, however constituted, were imbued with the spirit of offensive action to the point that to sit and await
orders could not be tolerated.
Corps and Division Commanders passed on to subordinates, missions which allowed and demanded the same degree
of initiative entrusted to them by the Army Commander.
Had not this concept of offensive action been evidenced at the highest echelon of command it is highly probable that
the attack against MAYENNE might well have developed into an ordinary attack operation.
Because it had been indoctrinated in the value of exploiting initiative, Task Force Weaver was assigned and
successfully accomplished a mission far beyond that normally expected of a similar force.
2.
ORGANIZATION
The attack of MAYENNE by Task Force Weaver tends to show the flexibility and teamwork that can be attained
within an Infantry Division by the intelligent employment of combined arms. Had the entire division been employed, the
attack might not have attained the complete success of the operation. Because of the lack of organic mobility of the division,
the enemy would have gained additional time in which to prepare defenses. Likewise, it is improbable that a Regimental
Combat Team would have accomplished the mission in the same fashion as Task Force Weaver, because of its lack of
organic mobility and firepower.
3.
MAINTENANCE OF DIRECTION
During the movement to the IP one of the companies became lost, which resulted in a slow down of the entire
operation at a most critical time. The success of the operation was not affected by this situation, however had other
comparable units of like size been subjected to equivalent loss of direction, the mission of the Task Force could not have
been accomplished without undue delay and confusion. The quick action of the Battalion Commander following his estimate
of the situation corrected what might have developed into a bad situation. Reconnaissance cannot always be accomplished
by unit commanders. In this instance it was a lack of time, and Company B could not be held at fault when it followed the
wrong road out of town. Route, markers and well oriented guides would have averted this situation.
4.
USE OF EXPEDIENTS
The actions of Colonel Barth in pushing the 2d and 3d Battalions across the river warrants consideration. The rapid
envelopment of the town might well have been delayed because of the major obstacle (the river). The rubber boats were as
far forward in the column as the tactical situation would permit. There can be no criticism on this point. However, Colonel
Barth's actions in deciding to start a crossing, using whatever material could be found in the area, constituted a calculated risk
and resulted in the maximum exploitation of the surprise element.
5.
CONTROL BY COMMANDERS
During the attack on MAYENNE, the position of the commanders in relation to the troops commanded, was a
deciding factor. Control was maintained at all times. Subordinate commanders were not forced to wait for a decision from
higher headquarters. The commanders placed themselves in position at all times from where they could best control the
troops command, and observe the action as it developed.
6, PLANS AND ORDERS
All plans for this attack were well understood by those concerned. They were flexible to the point that the Battalion
Commander was successful in halting an artillery preparation and launching an attack after the fires had been started.
 |
 |
 |