At 1800 the Battalion Commander ordered the attack resumed. Company K, with the tank
platoon attached, was ordered to pass through Company L on the right, and to debouch from the south
edge of the forest into the open field toward Lastelle. (See Map C) Company L was deployed so as to
protect the right flank of the battalion. Company I was similarly deployed along the battalion left flank.
The adjacent battalions on the right and left were approximately 500 yards to the rear of the
advance elements of the 3rd Battalion. Large gaps existed between the units. Enemy infiltrations from
the flanks and the rear were probable.
Company K moved into the attack with three tanks the fourth remaining in the forest to provide
additional support and security to the remainder of the battalion. As Company K advanced into the open
fields it was met by heavy enemy fire from dug-in positions located to their front and right flank. Tanks
1 and 2 were knocked out immediately by a self-propelled gun firing from an orchard several hundred
yards to the south. (See Map C) Tank 3 moved out into the open field, bogged down in a marshy area
and was immobilized. (See Map C) Notwithstanding the loss of the tanks, Company K moved forward
and reached the hedgerows as indicated on Map C. Companies I and L, in the meantime, were still
heavily engaged with the enemy on the battalions right and left flank in the forest.
At 2000, Company Ks advance was halted. Heavy fire from the front and flanks was inflicting
heavy casualties. The Company Commander attempted to return to the forest to acquaint the Battalion
Commander of the situation, but was severely wounded. (33) The Executive Officer, finding the
company position untenable, also endeavored to reach the command group in order to
request permission to withdraw his unit. He also became a casualty.
The entire battalion continued to be engaged with the enemy until dusk. At this time, Company
B, 358th Infantry, was attached to the 3rd Battalion. This unit was deployed on the right flank to assist
Company L in resisting the strong German pressure directed from the direction of Hill Y (see Map C).
This enemy action, in addition to that on the left flank, prevented Companies I and L from advancing to
the southeast towards the objective.
As darkness descended, Company K was forced to withdraw to the forest. The Battalion
Commander deployed the depleted companies in a square formation for the night near the south edge of
the forest. The adjacent battalions had not yet been able to advance to the line now held by the 3rd
Battalion. (34) (See Map C)
From dusk to 0430, 10-11 July, the ammunition and pioneer platoon moved rations, water, and
ammunition into the battalion area. Litter bearers evacuated the wounded throughout the night. At
daylight additional casualties were found in the forest, and the total evacuated to the battalion aid station
numbered eighty-five. An undetermined number of Company Ks wounded had been evacuated by the
Germans after the companys withdrawal. The Company Executive Officer was found and evacuated
subsequent to the battalions advance from the forest. Be reported that he had bean treated by German
aid men. (35) Prior to the attack on Hill 122 the rifle companies were approximately 20% under
At dusk, 10 July, the strength of the rifle companies of the battalion were as follows:
2 officers 64 enlisted men
1 officer 31 enlisted men