ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM
In a study of this operation several factors are outstanding. First of all the operation to be
undertaken was very sound in principle and easy to understand. This was true all way from Third Army
down through the Corps’ plan, Division plan and lastly, that of the battalion. There were no complicated
maneuvers erected on the Corps level, or further down on the division level. The plan for a pincer
action, from the north and south of Metz, was the only solution to such a strongly fortified area.
The entire operation was dependent upon secrecy, which was maintained and achieved by all
levels, until actual contact was made on the enemy side of the Moselle. This was achieved through the
movement of units at night, no unusual activities, even though great plans were being drawn up, the
maintenance of normal artillery fires and the sealing of patrols, from the assembly areas, occupied by the
assaulting troops.
This was one of the few operations in which ample time was given the subordinate commanders
to make thorough reconnaissance of future areas of operation. The same applied to the proper
orientation and briefing of troops, prior to jump off.
The point that almost spelled disaster, for the entire operation, was the unforseen condition that
developed with the Moselle river itself. It seemed to wait, as though controlled by the Germans, for the
attacking forces to get across on the enemy side and then release its rushing power as an almost
unsurmountable obstacle. The overall operation was hinged on the hasty construction of a bridge in the
division area. This condition was one beyond the control of any one individual. It cannot be laid as
criticism against any one person or group of individuals. There could have been some information
accrued from the natives of that area, as the conditions that existed with the river, during rainy seasons.
This could on the other hand, have given away the operation. The entire credit for the success of this
operation on the fort, goes to the skill, guts and daring of each individual “dogface”. There were
absolutely, no support fires of any sort throughout the reduction of the fort.
The one criticism to be voiced is the lack of coordination with the support engineers, that being
the 179th Engineer Battalion. It is much more desirable to have support elements that are organic to the
unit performing the action. The feeling of esprit de corps and feeling of the ultimate accomplishing of
the mission does not exist with strange units attached, only for isolated actions. It is not known as to
who was at fault in the instance where the assault boats were left unmanned at the river bank on the
initial crossing. This could very easily have upset the entire operation, had it not been for the action of
the people within the crossing unit itself, in gathering together of the boats and crossing on their own.
The condition that existed due to the long haul of the assault boats from Huzange to the riverbank was
not desired. This haul was too long, and recognized as such. However, due to the high priority on
secrecy this was necessary, since Huzange was the last covered area, before reaching the crossing site.
The men were thoroughly winded upon reaching the launching site and had to regain strength prior to
the crossing. An alert enemy could have completely suppressed the crossing.
Later prisoner reports revealed a sense of false security existed with the Germans, due to the
condition of the Moselle and the contemplated rise of the river. An assault crossing was certainly not
expected at flood stage.
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