On August 17th we moved into a dense forest in the vicinity of Le Pin-au-Haras, where we were
greeted by a few mortar rounds, which had no effect. We fired well over 900 rounds that day, all
directed at the enemy now falling into our trap.
On August 18 while the Colonel was up forward with the Regimental Commander, the enemy
lobbed a few mortar rounds too close, and resulted in wounding his driver, Ed Snider. When they got
him back to our aid station Captain Culp and Sgt. "Pappy Mills" did such a good job of patching him up
that he did not need to be evacuated. Lt. Paul Raley and Pfc. Bill Thornley, Able Battery forward
observers were also wounded. Thornley had to be taken to the rear, but Lt. Raley was not.
Late that afternoon we moved into position on the outer edge of the trap, from which we were to
cause so much damage to the "Hun". The move was more to the side than it was forward, enabling us to
fully block the last opening with our fire. That particular day we fired 1100 rounds. Targets were
getting more numerous and observation was better. Though we fired a great deal that day we still had
no idea that the "gap" was going to mean so much.
The Falaise Gap
The Falaise Pocket, or Gap, as the papers always managed to title it, was a valley bounded by
high hills in dense forests, with the towns of Chambois and Le Bourg-St. Leonard on one side of it, and
the other small settlements of Ste. Eugénie and Tournai-sur-Dives located on the small dry river that was
really the only available outlet left. From our present position we covered that one outlet with a
murderous fire. It was here that the 90th finally eradicated the German7th from the High Command's
list. It was here that the remnants of 20 German divisions were annihilated.
The picture of the final positions were as follows: the 358th Infantry was situated on the high
ground facing north into the pocket, while the 359th Infantry was in and around the town of Chambois,
facing northwest, thus forming a large “L”, with the long axis running East-West. The center of the “L”
was a valley bounded by high hills, behind which the artillery was in position, and in the valley were our
victims. The hills around the valley afforded good OP's for the observers, and our communications were
complete. Fort Sill set up only there was nothing "canned" about this particular problem. During the
action, any targets missed by ground observers were picked up by the liaison pilots, our only air support
during the whole engagement.
Besides our own division artillery which was at the disposal of this battalion, we had the 186th
F.A., a 155 howitzer outfit, and a 240th F.A. a 155 gun outfit, and their respective groups. Also there
were tanks, tank destroyers and infantry cannon companies, these three last groups were up in there
firing direct.
The heavy part of the firing was between the 18th and the 20th of August, in which time there
were an estimated 3000 German guns, staff cars, tanks, self-propelled guns, and horse-drawn vehicles
destroyed, and every conceivable type of vehicle used to haul troops and their supplies.
During the entire time we were firing our radio net sounded like a big broadcast of a football
game. Everyone who was not doing something was hanging around one of many 610 radios, including
the doughboys, listening to the blow-by-blow accounts given by the liaison pilots who were continually
flying over the valley where the enemy was.
 |
 |
 |