Most of our ammunition was spent on TOT’s and marking targets for our dive bombers.
Because of the absence of full 5th sections, all TOT’s were fired on definite information that the target
was worthy of the ammunition expended. Frenchmen infiltrating through the lines, and Germans who
had decided it was better to be alive in an American prison camp than a good German, one who had died
for the Fuehrer, furnished most of the data for our targets. These TOT’s had a demoralizing effect on
the Germans and induced many to surrender, that is, those that were not killed or injured in the shelling.
One enemy gun emplacement, our concentration Number 33 C, will be remembered by all.
Countless rounds were spent trying to silence these guns but they were still firing when we left the area
some weeks later. 105’s, 155’s, 8-inchers, 240’s all tried, the place was marked for bombing a number
of times but still they fired back. Yes, 33 Charlie will long be remembered.
In an effort to substitute for lack of artillery ammunition, Task Force Higgins was formed.
Headed by Lt. Higgins, Baker executive, the task force consisted of 10 Sherman tanks from Motor
Charlie, Company “C”, 712th Tank Battalion; set up as three batteries with a central fire direction. The
tankers were unused to indirect firing, but under Lt. Higgins expert tutelage were soon slamming those
“75” shells right where the FO’s wanted them.
Much captured enemy artillery material was put into action against the enemy. 10 cm and 88
batteries were set up and manned by various units in the Metz perimeter. Ammunition for these guns
was plentiful as vast stores were captured in the Argonne Forest. It was a pleasure to send the Kraut
Ammunition back at them, especially when they received it the hard way.
This developed into more or less of a holiday mission. Rest centers were set up and every effort
was made to get movies, Clubmobiles and other forms of entertainment. Despite the fact that
government officials at home were assuring the “home front” that there was an abundance of
ammunition, we were still limited to a very small daily expenditure.
17 October Brig. Gen. J. A. Van Fleet assumed command of the division succeeding Gen.
McLain who had earned himself the command of a corps thru his brilliant leadership and the exploits of
the famous Fighting 90th. It was during the time of Gen. McLain’s reign over the Tough ‘Ombres that
the title of the “90th Panzer Grenadiers” was bestowed on us by our enemy. The Krauts had the highest
respect for the division and feared it greatly.
During October the infantry continued to inch into Maiziers le Metz and after bitter fighting for
every little section of the town, they managed to get a good solid foothold. A large slag pile near the
city had proven to be a great obstacle, as was a chateau on the other side of town. Both proved to be a
big help to the enemy in holding their position and as vantage points for observation.
The latter part of October orders were received to take Maiziers. In preparation for the attack a
155 mm SP gun was moved into a factory near an enemy strong point to fire at point blank range. The
strong point – the schoolhouse, the range – 150 yards. Artillery ammunition ceased to be rationed for
the attack and everything was in readiness on 28 October.
0730, October 29, all artillery opened up with a preparation that was to initiate the attack. A few
false preparations had been fired during the previous 24 hours and the Krauts, thinking that this was
another, failed to respond until it was too late. Many were caught flat-footed and found it useless to
resist, while in other parts of the town bitter fighting resulted.. The town was systematically cleaned out
and at 0845 the next morning the schoolhouse was all that remained in enemy hands. Later in the day
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