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ACTION IN THIONVILLE
The trepidation with which the Germans regarded the XX Corps’ threat to their Moselle River
line was clearly shown on the night of September 7th.  The newly equipped 106th Panzer Brigade struck
down from Luxembourg in an attempt to knife to the rear of the 90th Division which was then
advancing, three regiments abreast, toward Thionville on the north flank of the Corps.  The attack was a
surprise, but the antitank defenses in the rear security groups were quickly thrown into action and they
knocked out most of the attacking brigade before noon of the following day.  The attack on Thionville
was delayed briefly, but the enemy had sacrificed another of his striking forces without achieving any
great tactical objective.  The attack on Thionville was resumed on the 10th of September and major
elements of a 90th Division reached the Moselle near the town on the 12th.  The Division reported that it
was prepared to cross.  General Walker, however, decided not to make crossings at this point because of
the extended front of his Corps, and orders were issued to hold the ground gained against the fortified
area on the Corps' north flank.
ACTION IN THE SOUTH
Tank columns of the 7th Armored Division following the cavalry task forces south of Metz met
heavy resistance when they struck the center of the enemy salient near a Gravelotte on the afternoon of
September 6.  Bypassing this strong point, the armored columns pushed south to Gorze where heavy
artillery fire and extensive minefields were encountered.  Cutting through the enemy resistance, the
armor reached the river line at Dornot in the early morning of September 7th.  A small assault force of
armored infantry was rushed across, but heavy artillery fire and infantry counterattacks made the tiny
bridgehead untenable.  By nightfall the 70 men of the assault force were in a serious position and
attempting to withdraw.
At this time the Corps Commander issued orders to the 5th Infantry Division to cross in strength
at Dornot in order to knife into the outer ring of Metz forts from the south and rear.  Thick mud and
heavy misty rain hampered operations and slowed the advance to the west bank of the river; but at 2200
hrs on the night of the7th of September the river line was reached.  A point was selected that offered
concealment from observation from the east bank and assault boats were hand carried down the steep
banks in silence to the waters edge.
D-day for the crossing, September 8th, dawned wet and cold.  At first there was no appreciable
amount of enemy fire on the crossing site, but about 1000 hours the enemy became aware of his danger
and poured a hail of artillery and mortar fire on both banks of the river.  Corps artillery opened up on the
enemy batteries and a battalion of infantry was put across during the afternoon in spite of continual
sniping and direct fire from Tiger tanks at close range.  The assault forces moved up the steep eastern
banks of the Moselle and swept forward under the menacing guns of Fort Verdun, which was about a
mile to the east, and Fort Driant, located about 3000 yards to the northwest.  These forts had excellent
observation from commanding terrain and were able to pour heavy and accurate fire at the bridgehead
troops and the supporting engineers of the 1103rd Engineer Combat Group of XX Corps.
Corps infantry troops drove ahead under this barrage and worked up the steep hills to the edge of
Fort Verdun.  It became immediately evident that the fort was too heavily defended for the limited
firepower of the assault troops.  The path was cleared through five separate double-apron type, barbed
wire barriers; but, in circling the fort proper, was a dry moat 30 feet deep, which, itself, was protected by