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to a total of 15 served as parts of XII Corps in various stages of the fighting, being freely pulled in or out
in accordance with the changing needs of the tactical or strategic situation. Colonel Frank R. Veale the
Corps G-1 has estimated that approximately a quarter million men served in XII Corps at one time or
another in Europe. A division's component parts remain relatively constant; for Corps, internal change
is the rule rather than the exception. This circumstance, which renders difficult compiling of a Corps
history (and impossible the inclusion in such a history of the usual complete rosters, lists of
commendations and awards, and so forth, that will be found at the back of most unit histories) has useful
application in battle. As said elsewhere, the army-corps-division team together make up a weapon
analogous to the old-fashioned flail; or perhaps it might be better likened to one of those "morning stars"
of medieval warfare, in which the Army is represented by the iron handle, the Division by the spiky steel
knob, and the Corps by the chain which, connecting the two loosely but firmly, multiplies the blow of
the knob and prevents the enemy from knowing exactly how hard, or from exactly what quarter, the next
stroke is going to fall on him.
Only the Corps headquarters and its "organic elements" remain in general without change, and it
is these parts of the organization which give the Corps most of its individual character. And individual
character was what XII Corps had in full measure.
The reader may well be warned at this juncture that if he is not prepared to approach this
chronicle with acceptance of its major premise, i.e. that XII US Army Corps was an exceptionally fine
and successful outfit, he should proceed no further. This premise is not quite the customary vehement
and unsupported asseveration to the effect that the organization dealt with is the "best damn unit in the
best damned Army in the world," etc. there will be found occasional hints of the spirit scattered
throughout this volume, as well as some good-natured kidding of XII Corps' closest "rival" among
"competing" corps in Third Army, -- both attitudes of the sort freely indulged in by members of any
proud outfit in war. But jesting aside, it is honestly believed that the record spread across the following
pages speaks more eloquently than such normal oratory for the conclusion that XII Corps was
exceptional, if not actually unique, in its performance during World War II. To mention only two items
in the bill of argument, the reader is referred to the comparative table of towns liberated or captured on
page 450, and is urged to glance through the ten maps showing the Advance of Third Army's front and
note the position of XII Corps' share of that front in each instance. The fame of the Corps was by no
means limited to Third Army. It was not uncommon for personnel in divisions which had never served
in either the Corps or the army to say: "Put us in Third Army and XII Corps and we'll show you!" Of
course, since "a good Corps attracts good divisions," XII Corps was fortunate in the great infantry and
armored divisions attracted to it. The exploits of these divisions, and of the other magnificent units that
joined with the divisions to make up XII Corps, reflected glory not only upon themselves but also upon
the Corps of which they were parts. Without their efforts, as will be clearly demonstrated in the pages to
follow, the Corps headquarters would have been operating in a vacuum. Nevertheless, the rest of 80 y
headquarters organization itself had something especially its own to contribute to the combination.
What was this special character? An attempt has been made, it is feared with indifferent success,
to sketch that quality in the course of the following narrative. It lay, naturally, partly in the policies and
personalities in command of the Corps; but the personalities of the staff also contributed a great deal.
Shortly after VE-Day the Chief of Staff required the various staff sections to submit an extensive study
of their operations in combat; it is an interesting and useful document, but the basic elements which
made the headquarters so successful have eluded even this careful analysis. "The policies of the XII
Corps Staff," comments Colonel P M Martin in the Chief of Staff section of the study, "were in all
probability not greatly different in theory from those of any other, but constant vigorous effort was made
to adhere to those policies and translate them into action. The policy that had the greatest effect on
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