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attacks on known strong points of the German invasion defense scheme. While these strong points were
constructed primarily as defenses to repel an amphibious operation, they were adapted for all around
fire. Since the strong points were in depth from the coast, they presented considerable obstacles to the
advance of our troops. Due to the inclemency of the weather, the result of these attacks were largely
interdictory in nature. There were no close support missions flown in the initial phase of the attack.
During the later phases of the period, air effort was directed at gun positions, supply
installations, munition dumps and lines of communication directly in rear of the enemy. The targets
were located from information gained during the attack. These missions were largely successful when
weather was favorable. In many cases, dive bombing attacks were made by P-47's when the cloud base
did not allow the planes to make an accurate bomb run.
The heaviest air operation occurred on 11 July. Twenty-two targets located north of the
Lessay-Periers Road in an area 3000 by 2000 meters in size were attacked in the evening. This attack
had been held up for two days on account of weather. Approximately 200 sorties were flown from the
United Kingdom in execution of this mission. A part of this effort failed to locate the target and bombed
100 yards in front of the 79th Infantry Division troops. Fortunately, no casualties resulted to our troops
and they were able to take advantage of this close support to continue their advance.
During the entire operation, the Corps Artillery rendered effective support to the attack with
counter-battery, interdiction, neutralization and supporting fires. The 12th Observation Battalion
extended survey control into forward areas locating targets by flash and enemy batteries by sound and
flash. During this period, the development and use of the P-51 fighter aircraft for observation was
continued and excellent results obtained for long-range adjustments of fire. Reports of prisoners and
civilians indicate that our artillery fire was most effective in the destruction of material, personnel, and
morale. Harassing interdiction fires were delivered daily and counter-battery fire was reported effective.
The 106th Cavalry Group, consisting of the 106th and the 121st Cavalry Reconnaissance
Squadrons, performed reconnaissance and surveillance missions in the rear areas of the divisions
reducing pockets of enemy resistance, and protected the flanks of the Corps.
The period of 15 July to 25 July was one of consolidation and regrouping of the First United
States Army forces in preparation for execution of the plan "Cobra". This attack was to be initiated by
the VII Corps and it was decided to effect a penetration of the enemy front followed with an armored
exploitation to the south and west in the direction of Coutances. The point of penetration selected was a
narrow front to the west of St. Lo and it was intended to open up a gap between Marigny and St. Gilles,
to permit the passage of the armored forces. This attack was to be preceded by a "saturation" bombing
intended to paralyze the enemy front and initiate the breakthrough. The VII Corps was given the 1st,
4th, 9th and 30th Infantry Divisions and the 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions. VIII Corps was to attack
the enemy from the north, delaying its attack long enough to permit the effect of the VII Corps action to
be felt, but not long enough to permit enemy withdrawal.
The attack was originally set for 21 July but bad weather set in and forced a series of
postponements until 25 July 1944.
During the interim, VIII Corps consolidated its positions generally along the north bank of the
Ay River, and regrouped its forces. Vigorous patrolling was carried out, as well as harassing artillery
fire. On 15 July ten battalions of artillery participated in a "serenade" fired against a concentration of
enemy artillery and trucks, with devastating effect.
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