PINPOINTING METZ
The 3rd Cavalry Group, reinforced by a battalion of tank destroyers, was spread over a front of
20.5 miles along the Moselle River. It screened the troop movements to its rear from Thionville to the
northern boundaries of the XX Corps zone. The 95th Infantry Division, by the 2nd of November, had
disposed its forces around the fortified salient west of the Moselle. On the 8th of November, the armor
began its move north to an assembly area behind the Cattenom Forest. It was prepared on order of the
Corps Commander to pass through the Koenigsmacher bridgehead and thereby kindle the spark that
would set the front ablaze and culminate in the destruction of the fortified barrier standing like an
armored shield between the XX Corps and the Saar River.
Early in November, the 5th Division came back from its training grounds and rest centers to take
over once more the bridgehead area south of Metz. After the bridgehead was re-occupied, patrols
learned that the enemy had prepared a systematic defense works with mines, roadblocks, and blown
bridges. The enemy line was held by a Regiment of the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division, two fortress
machine-gun battalions, and several battalions of the Stellung type which out-posted the river at night,
but withdrew to strong points in the villages during the day. On the 3rd November, the 5th Infantry
Division was informed of its task in the XX Corps operations to envelop Metz from the south. The
initial mission was to affect the crossing of the Seille River and drive to the Nied River in the vicinity of
Bazoncourt.
The enemy was known to have concentrations in Louvigny and around the stronghold of Fort
L'Aisne. In addition to the artillery fire plan for covering the strong points, the XIX Tactical Air
Command was called upon for bombardment of the Fort L'Aisne position and other known strong points
in the zone south of Metz. Two squadrons of fighter-bombers were to provide tactical support on the
initial days of the bridgehead operation. On the 8th of November, the 5th Infantry Division was
informed by XX Corps Headquarters that its portion of the operation would begin at 0530 hrs,
November 9th.
On the afternoon of November the 8th, the Seille River began to rise as a result of a three-day
heavy rainfall. By midnight it had overflowed its natural banks and spread out to a width of 300-600
feet at the proposed sites for crossing. It was decided to cross all assault companies by a assault boats
instead of by employing footbridges at the planned position. The first assault crossing of the infantry
support bridge north of Cheminot was slow and difficult. The leading assault elements grew fire while
proceeding along the ridge east of the Seille River.
Leaving the advance units to engage the enemy, the remainder of the bridgehead force, under
cover of a smokescreen and early-morning fog, rushed the slopes of the ridge and secured the wooded
knoll that dominated Fort L’Aisne, 3000 yards to the north. The enemy's reaction to the occupation of
the hill was a heavy artillery concentration falling dead center on the wooded area.
The 9th of November was a gray, misty the day. The ground was heavy with clinging mud
thickly sewn with land that personnel mines. Little cover for the advancing troops was found along the
open slopes east of the Seille. The low hanging clouds and heavy mist reduced air support to a
minimum and denied the attacking troops the encouragement of seeing planes of the XIX Tactical Air
Command bombing and strafing the enemy strong points.
The engineers, however, were in close support with assault boats, foot bridges, and rafts and
there were guides to direct the infantry to the proper sites. The 1103rd Engineer Combat Group of XX
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