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Ray Wright and the Survey Section
In mid-April, in the waning weeks of the war in Europe, Capt Bill Beck, then
commanding A Battery, was one of a very small quota of distinguished combat veterans
to be rotated back to the United States. Our battalion commander, Bob T. Hughes, saw a
chance to give Ray Wright what he had so long deserved a captain's job and an
opportunity for promotion.
Of course it turned out to be too late: the war was over before he was eligible, and
after that everything was chaos. But even before that time, Hughes had occasion to
wonder if he had made a wise decision.
Let me explain.
Military maps are marked off in a grid with squares of a uniform size, and
locations on the map are described by coordinates, sets of numbers which indicate which
square it is in and how far from the lower left corner of that square. On the best of the
European maps we used, the squares were the equivalent of 1,000 meters (one kilometer,
or roughly 0.6 mile) on the ground.
When Ray Wright was kicked upstairs, he was replaced by Lt Leonard Wagner
from C Battery. Early in Wagner's career, we made one move for which I somehow
missed going on the reconnaissance, so I arrived at the new CP without knowing much of
anything about the ground. Wagner brought in the survey information, and I had it plotted
on the HCO chart, a blank grid sheet with squares the equivalent of those on the map, and
the VCO chart, which was the map itself.
About that time, B Battery checked in, saying they were in position ready to fire.
Since we always fired a registration as soon as possible after a move, I alerted the
observer in the airplane to get ready to observe it, and we got the data ready to send to the
battery.
Just then Capt Arlo Knowles, the S-2, who had been on the reconnaissance,
strolled into the FDC and glanced at the VCO chart. "Hey, that's not right! The batteries
aren't on the other side of that little lake; they're on this side. "
"Are you sure?"
"Sure, I'm sure. Look, I've got 'em plotted on the situation map." "Cease firing," I
said. "Somebody go find Lt Wagner."
When Wagner arrived, he took a look at the chart and went into shock. When he
recovered, he was able to explain without making a new survey. He had just misread the
coordinates of the starting point by one digit - the first digit, the one, which indicated
what 1,000 meter square it was in. Everything was plotted exactly one kilometer (6/10 of
a mile) too far north.
A simple mistake, but it served to emphasize how much we had always depended
on Ray Wright.
All honor to Lt Col Hughes, who resisted the temptation to recall Wright to his
old job. And to Wagner, who never made the same mistake again. And particular honor
to the Survey Section, which never let him do so. After all, they had been well trained by
Ray Wright.
177, (178 blank)
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