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Essay Nine
The Cannon Company
At the beginning of WW II, an infantry regiment contained three infantry
battalions. Each battalion contained three rifle companies and one heavy weapons
company. The heaviest of the heavy weapons was an 81mm mortar, which had a fairly
short range (something less than two miles, I believe), but fired a shell which burst with
some authority. However, it was smaller than the artillery's 105mm shell.
Then it occurred to someone that the infantry regiment should have some kind of
cannon with a bigger shell, so they wouldn't have to depend on the vagaries of a direct
support artillery battalion. Consequently, the War Department decreed that each infantry
regiment should have a "Cannon Company" with three platoons of two cannon each, so
that if a battalion had to operate independently, it could be assigned one platoon, and
have a third of the company's fire power.
The weapon chosen to arm the Cannon Company was a sawed-off version of the
105 howitzer we used. It fired exactly the same ammunition we did, but had a barrel at
least a yard shorter. That made it lighter in weight, so it could be pulled by a smaller
truck and manhandled into position more easily. It also meant that it had a mile or so less
range.
When the 357th, 358th, and 359th Inf Regts first got their new armament, they
were not quite sure what to do with it, so they appealed to Div Arty for help in training
the newly organized companies in gunnery, "cannoneers hop," and other necessary
techniques. I recall Lt John Klas teaching cannoneers and platoon executives how to lay
the guns parallel and how to use the sights and level the elevation bubbles. We also
transferred some of our personnel to help get things started.
Eventually they became proficient, although we professional artillerists were
inclined to feel patronizing about the idea that infantrymen could compete with us at our
own game.
After that we tended to forget about the Cannon Company, except that we ran into
them from time to time on maneuvers and field exercises and kept on friendly terms.
Then came D-Day and the ensuing weeks of hedgerow warfare. I have mentioned
in Chapters 2 and 3 of my narrative some of the problems artillery faced at that time: lack
of observation, problems with communications, and my own difficulties in keeping track
of our forward elements so we wouldn't fire at them.
Apparently the 359th Cannon Company had the same problems. In spades,
because they didn't have enough personnel to do all the things our battalion staff did. We
had been in combat about three weeks when the captain commanding the Cannon
Company came to our CP looking haggard. He poured out his troubles to our new
commander, Major Eric Peach. "Major, I don't know what to do. My observers can't find
a place where they can see what to shoot at. "
"I know the problem." Peach waved him to a seat on a standing five gallon water
can.
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