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The Glamour War
Our command structure changed to fit the situation. When the 90th Division was
operating together in a small area, the 915th FA Bn was under the command of the 90th
Division Artillery (Div Arty). But now that it was spread all over the map and moving
quickly, the division formed into regimental combat teams (RTCs). That meant that we,
together with Company C of the 315th Engr Bn and various other small units, were
placed under the command of the CO, 359th Inf Rgt and now CO of the 359th RCT,
Colonel Robert Bacon.
The main striking force of the 90th Division during this time was called Task
Force Weaver. It comprised the 357th RCT, very heavily reinforced, under the command
of the new Assistant Division Commander, Brigadier General "Wild Bill" Weaver. As his
nickname suggests, he was an aggressive fighter, and fortunately, a very competent one.
The other two RCTs, the 358th and 359th, came behind to mop up anything they had
bypassed.
The regimental combat team arrangement, like most things, had good and bad
features, especially for Eric Peach, our CO. Now he did not have to worry about Div Arty
giving him a goose egg and telling him when to move. Since Col Bacon knew very little
about artillery, he let Peach decide on his own when and where to move. A lot of the time
we moved so fast that we didn't have time to unhook the howitzers from the trucks and go
into firing position at all, but sometimes we slowed down enough to go into hasty
positions with a minimum of such amenities as laying a lot of telephone wire and digging
in. During the first two weeks of August, we moved a total of 212 miles and did not fire
at all except on two days, and then a mere 166 rounds. [in heavy fighting, we would fire
more than that in an hour!]
The drawback for Eric Peach was that Col Bacon, knowing very little about
artillery, felt that, as our commander, he should always know where we were and what
we were doing. And try to understand it.
I spent quite a little of my time with him, trying with limited success to explain
the weird things we did. One time it took me over an hour to explain that we were not
firing because nobody up forward (FOs, LnGs, or infantry company commanders) had
asked us to, and unless they did, we wouldn't know where to shoot effectively, or even
safely. I finally got him to call Captain Jiggs Fisk, who was commanding the little
infantry task force out in front and ask him if he needed artillery fire. Jiggs assured him
that it was the last thing he wanted, because he was in the middle of a delicate (and
successful) maneuver.
Colonel Bacon, as I have indicated, was an unpredictable man. One time during
this campaign he placed his command post (CP) several miles off to the right of his line
of advance ... in an area where there had been no American troops before, on an open
flank where there weren't any German troops, but might have been. The location required
excessive telephone wire to reach his battalions, and in general was not a tactically sound
arrangement.
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