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Upstarts
Because of our range limitations and the necessity not to get too far forward, we
generally moved about 3 to 6 miles at a bound. Since it was unwise to go on reconnais-
sance forward of the front lines, we couldn't make much preparation to move before the
infantry had advanced to about 4 miles ahead of us. So when and how often we moved
depended on what was going on with the infantry. Looking back, I suppose the norm was
about a move a day, but there weren't many normal days. The longest time we were in the
same position was the month we spent near Gravelotte, a few miles west of Metz. The
most moves we ever made in a day were four, but it was a lo-o-o-ng day, starting at
daylight and ending about midnight.
Under ideal conditions, a move could be made in two or three hours. That
assumes the reconnaissance has been made, and is from the time the first firing battery
has been given "March Order," until the last battery is in the new position, ready to fire. It
also assumes many weary hours of prior training, so that every man knows exactly what
he has to do to get ready and move.
The firing batteries, A, B, and C (Able, Baker, Charley in the phonetic alphabet of
the time) were particularly the scene of frenzied activity. The split trail of each piece
(howitzer) was closed and locked together, the rammer-staff clamped in its travel position
on the trail, the sight removed and stowed in a jar-proof box, a canvas cover stretched
over the piece and strapped down, and a dozen other things done. Meanwhile, the "prime
mover," a 2 1/2 ton truck, had wheeled in, and the cannoneers hooked the howitzer onto
the truck's trailer hitch, loaded onto the truck all other equipment, plus ammunition that
was on the ground waiting to be fired, and climbed on themselves.
The telephone people were busy picking up the local wire, loading the
switchboard, and getting ready to lay the same wire again in the new position. The
gasoline fires in the kitchen ranges and underwater heaters were extinguished and ranges
and heaters loaded onto the mess truck, along with any rations, utensils, and other
impedimenta that were not already on the truck. [Hopefully, they were not in the middle
of serving a meal at the time, but if they were, eating had a lower priority than moving.]
In order to avoid a period when we were unable to fire, we habitually moved two
firing batteries, the ones farthest to the rear, and waited until they were in the new
position and ready to fire before moving the third. The fire direction center (FDC) split in
two, half of it going forward to get set up and ready to fire the two leading firing
batteries. As soon as they were in business, they would radio back for the rest of the FDC
and the third firing battery to come forward. In the mean time, if the rear FDC needed to
fire more than the one battery that stayed behind, it still had communications with other
battalions who could reinforce our fire.
It always seemed to Doug Myers (Bn Exec) and Don Thomson (Asst S-3), the
officers who stayed with the rear FDC, that it took far too long for the forward CP to get
ready. It seemed to us at the forward CP and FDC that they were altogether too impatient,
and that we were hurrying as fast as humanly possible. We had to wait until the survey of
the battery positions was complete, enough wire laid to enable us to talk to the FOs and
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