Upstart
The infantry, nicknamed the "Queen of Battle," is the key and most important part of any
army. It is the part that attacks the enemy, defends against him, and, hopefully, eventually
defeats and overcomes him. Everyone else is there for the express and sole purpose of helping
and supporting the infantry in accomplishing its mission. In an infantry division, the most
conspicuous support is given by the artillery, and most infantrymen who have been in combat
understand, or at least appreciate, that support. To quote one combat infantryman, John Colby,
author of War From the Ground Up, ". . . The infantry protects the artillery so the artillery can
shoot the bejesus out of the enemy_ "
To establish a structure for assuring that an infantry regiment gets artillery fire" when it
needs it, a field artillery battalion is assigned the job of direct support. Consequently, unless the
359th Infantry Regiment was in reserve, or otherwise not in contact with the enemy, the mission
of the 915th FA Bn was to see that the regiment got whatever artillery fire it needed. If we
couldn't furnish it by the fire of our own three batteries (12 howitzers in all), we would get in
touch with any other artillery battalions within range - whether in the Division Artillery or the
Corps Artillery - and request additional fire from them. Occasionally there would be some reason
why they couldn't comply, but usually they were happy to oblige. However, except at our request
or with our permission, no other friendly artillery could fire in the zone of the 359th. This was
because we were supposed to know where all our infantry units were and could assure that they
didn't get any "friendly fire" down the back of their necks. Keeping track of our own front lines
was probably my own most important duty as S-2¹
of the 915th, a job I held for about the first
half of our time in combat.
How did I keep track? It wasn't always easy, but fortunately, the 915th had
representatives up with the infantry units. As a Direct Support battalion, the 915th had three
liaison officers (LnO's) (captains), each with a sizeable party of about six men and two jeeps, one
carrying a two-way radio, the other a reel of telephone wire. One LnO went to each of the three
battalions of the 359th Infantry Regiment, with instructions to form a symbiotic relationship with
the battalion commander and keep us informed on what was going on. After the first few days in
combat, the infantry battalion commanders were happy to have them along.
In addition, we were authorized three forward observers (FO's) (lieutenants) per battery,
so we had enough for one per rifle company. A FO party had only about three or four men, with
one jeep, a radio, and a small breast reel for hand-laying about half a mile of a lightweight,
flimsy telephone wire.
(FA tradition called for observers to find observation posts [OP's] on high ground, where
they could see the enemy and shoot at them. That immediately proved infeasible in combat, for
at least three reasons: 1. The Normandy hedgerows, used as fences around the tiny fields, were
high banks of earth with dense brush and stands of trees on top. You couldn't see further than
about 200 yards from anywhere. 2. The infantry tended to use lack of artillery fire as a reason/
excuse for not advancing, and unless they had observers with them, were unlikely to get it when
they needed it. 3. FO's who couldn't see the enemy couldn't see where the friendly troops were
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