side of the MAIN had been cleared and the tankers watched the Heines attempting to construct
entrenchments on the north side while the Long Toms blasted at them. 6 or 7 less fanatical Hitlerites
climbed into a rowboat and rowed across to surrender.
The MAIN crossing, spearheaded by the 90th in the vicinity of DOERNIGHEIM west of
HANAU and east of FRANKFORT, was contested by the Boche much more bitterly than he had the
RHINE. A Battalion of Hitler youth, led by veteran NCO instructors from an OCS in the neighborhood,
were not dismayed by the overwhelming advance of Allied Armies on all fronts, and they made a stand
for it. But their lines were spread too thinly and they were no match for the best functioning, most
experienced tank-infantry team in the ETO. The doughs crossed at 0300 28 March and soon were joined
by the Shermans. By the day’s end a 400 yard water barrier lay behind, with a firm 5 to 6 mile
bridgehead established to cover the debouchments of the 4th and 6th Armds., and the OCS Battalion had
been badly bloodied. The remaining days of March were marked by rapid progress in all sectors, as the
712th and 90th sped through the white flagged towns of the Hills of Hessen, with B Co., again attached
to the 4th Armd., running into the only thing that amounted to major resistance at SELTERS, where a
section of tanks were surprised by several Panzerfaustmen. And by the end of March the units were 250
miles inside Germany. They had swept past incalculable enemy material, rounded up many more
thousands of prisoners, and were ready to strike clear across the “Fatherland” into Czechoslovakia.
When April commenced the 712th and 90th were driving lancets through the HESSE
CORRIDOR, mopping up behind the 4th Armd., as well as conquering ground on their own. On the
right in XII Corps sector the 11th Armd. and 26th Inf. were making similar gains. Lines were stretched
to the utmost and on 1 April the disquieting information came that sizeable enemy forces had cut across
the axis of communication to the rear, blocked the Main Supply Route north of HOCHSTADT, and
were harassing and ambushing supply vehicles. Seven Serv. Co. trucks left NIEDERAULA for gas and
were set upon near WALLERNHAUSEN. A stiff fight ensued with the Serv. Co. boys, ill-equipped to
combat such tactics but resolute in their desires to keep the tanks supplied – a job they performed
throughout combat with great energy and skill – finally forced to capitulate, although one truck managed
to whee1 about and escape. This confusion and danger in the rear, a natural incident to long stride
advances with extended lines, was shortly corrected when light tanks were attached to all supply
columns, but only after the 712th Personnel Section, along with the other units in 90th Rear at
OFFENBACH, readied themselves for the attack only to find that a burning carload of ammo had been
the cause of the alarm. And in several days all personnel who had been captured in these ambushes
were once again back at their parent units.
When the 4th Armd. shifted out of XII Corps the 90th was once again on its own, fronting the
left flank of the Corps drive, with the 11th Armd. on the right and the 26th and 71st Infs. in the rear. B
Co. and 359, again doing superb work with the 4th Armd remained with that spectacular Division until 4
April. They showed their mettle at MADELUNGEN where a band of SS Troops evidently thought that
they could stop this experienced team and were soon outwitted, outfought and whipped. The crooked,
narrow WERRA RIVER now stood in the way of the 90th’s advance and proved to be a much greater
obstacle than had the once feared, mighty RHINE, as the Boche charged with defending its banks
displayed unusual tenacity and power. C Co. probed a weak spot and forded across with 357 on 2 Apr.
Striking straight out and with a classic display of marching fire and teamwork – highlighted by a dough
who served ably as an assistant tank gunner – stormed into DIPPACH. On 3 April they found a bald
ridge near VITZERODA stoutly defended by 100 SS Troops backed by mortars. The fighting continued
from 0930 until dark, when an adroit flanking movement by the tanks completely upset the Boche and
routed him. A Co., with 358, had reached the WERRA on 2 April but found that the railroad bridge they
had seized could only be used for foot-troops. So on 3 April part of this team forded across behind C
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