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BATTLE OF NORMANDY
At 0530, 3 July the 712th Tankers stood ready to attack on the heels of a mammoth artillery
barrage which had lasted 15 minutes.  Untested tankers were teamed with veteran infantrymen to engage
an enemy which had revived and reoriented after the initial shock of D-Day and in terrain which
required the utmost in tank-infantry cooperation.  The CHERBOURG campaign was nearly at an end,
the port itself having fallen to VII Corps which was regrouping for an assault south out of the peninsula
in conjunction with VIII Corps, which had now been assigned the task of pushing the Boche south and
cracking his defenses so that American arms could break into Central France.  The 79th Inf., 90th Inf.,
and 82nd Airborne were “divisions abreast” with the main effort on the left – the 90th’s zone.  B Co. and
Hq. assault Guns moved out with the 90th's 359th Regt. toward ST. JORES on the Division's right.  Co
C. later joined by a platoon from D Co., worked with the 358th Regt. at STE. SUZANNE and toward the
FORET DE MONT CASTRE on the Division's left.  A Co., assigned to the 82nd Airborne on the right
of the 90th, had two platoons in line supporting the 507th and 325th (Glider) Regts.
This was it.  By the end of the day every component of the 712th had been called upon to
perform and had responded.  Maintenance men had retrieved and repaired crippled tanks; radio men had
eliminated bugs; supply men had rushed forward with needed ammo, gas and oil; medics had tended the
wounded.  And at the end of the day the fighting men – already minus some who had paid the supreme
sacrifice – knew that they had been tested and proved able.  Ideas of tactics were radically altered in the
face of hedgerows.  The basic scheme of maneuvers and test problems – 1st section lay down a base of
fire, 2nd section hook right – had been quickly discarded.  What roads there were in agricultural
Normandy were heavily mined and under cover of well entrenched and concealed artillery pieces –
particularly the 88.  And although tanks were at times forced to blast bravely forward on these roads, a
great share of the fighting was done from field to field, each separated by ancient hedgerows in which
strong and supple roots gave firm foundation to the 3 to 4 feet walls of earth.  Time and again the tanks
would smash into these walls, teeter, and be forced to back up and charge again, all the while perhaps in
the very next field crouched the Boche, well dug in.  The average range for the 75 mm and 37 mm
cannons was 30 to 40 yards; belts of .30 cal. were fired by the co-ax and bog almost in complete strings. 
And the doughboys on the ground had to work in clock like harmony with the tanks.  If either element
forged too far ahead, the Boche could wipe it out.
But proficiency, teamwork and guts had paid off.  The Boche had been driven back some 1200
yards despite his evident and determined plan to contain the American forces in the small piece of the
peninsula they had conquered.  Captured enemy documents revealed that he intended to hold at any
price the newly formed MAHLMAN LINE, which extended from BEAU COUDRAY on the east
through the FORET to the west coast and was named for the Commander of the 353rd Inf. Div. which
was in immediate opposition.  From 4 July to 8 July this same intensive, bloody and unorthodox fighting
waged day and night.  A Co. with the 82nd was fighting savage resistance on the right flank, northeast of
LA HAYE DE PUITS.  The 79th Inf. could make little headway.  The 83rd Inf., operating with VII
Corps, could count as gains only a few hedgerows.  And B, C and D Cos. were assaulting the fanatically
defended FORET, with 8 of the 9 infantry battalions of the 90th completely committed.  The German
defense had been well planned and was superbly executed.  Capture of the FORET became essential –
without it we had no observation; with it the Boche had too much.  B Co. and Hq. 105s poured fire into
its vital spots.  C Co., besides offering the infantry close support, used its tanks in perilous efforts to take
supplies to isolated units.  D Co. fired approximately 750 rounds of 37 mm and 30,000 rounds of .30 cal.
on one day – 7 July.
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