 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
|
 |
 |
to consider that at night the platoon positions were too widely separated to be mutually
supporting and penetrations could be easily effected between them. No night patrolling system
was instituted and no readjustment of the front lines was made to fill in the caps between
platoons that would be covered by fire during the daylight. It was this failure of the battalion and
company commanders to personally ensure that the small unit defensive positions were
integrated into a united battalion defense that resulted in the loss of Kerling. Had the battalion
held Kerling that night, it is extremely doubtful if the counterattack of 12 November would have
proved anywhere near as serious as it did.
The use of artillery throughout the battle was outstanding. This was particularly true in
the initial fires when the artillery was used to neutralize the area of the Bois de Koenigsmacher,
in the fires on Kerling on the morning of 10 November which made it impossible for the
Germans to continue their counterattack that day, and in the fires on the counter attacking force
of the 12th, both in protecting Company G's position and in assisting in the breakup of the
assault elements near Petite Hettange. Without the tremendous help of the artillery in the
closely-knit infantry-artillery team, the Germans could not have been stopped from reaching the
river on the 12th and it is conceivable that they might have been able to force the division back
across the river.
The psychological effect of the arrival of the two tank destroyers at Petite Hettange on
the morning of 12 November was tremendous. The soldiers had been fighting grimly and well
up to their arrival, but when they saw that they finally had some armor of their own, their morale
improved greatly and their aggressive spirit returned in full.
The counterattack by the 2nd Battalion on the 12th was timed almost perfectly. The
Germans had been stopped, their armor had been almost eliminated, and they had just started to
retreat when the 2nd Battalion struck them squarely in the flank. The Germans had already
suffered heavy losses and a strong flank attack caught them by surprise. Almost instantly their
slow retreat became a route and they fled back to Kerling and were not able to mount another
counterattack against the regiment.
Except for a few small unit actions the regiment had been on the defensive for seven
weeks prior to the crossing of the Moselle. It was feared by some officers that the men might
have lost their aggressiveness, that they had become defense-minded rather than attack-minded.
This proved to be completely untrue. The combat efficiency of the regiment was as high or
higher during this battle than it was any other time during the war.
Of the action of the division in this operation General Patton stated in a letter of
commendation to the CG, 90th Infantry Division that "The capture development of your
bridgehead over the Moselle River in the vicinity of Koenigsmacher will ever rank as one is the
epic river crossings of history."
|
 |
|