The 1st and 2nd Battalions moved across in assault boats before dawn on the 6th of
December and advanced rapidly inland against surprisingly little organized resistance. The
coming of dawn, however, brought fire from the enemy-manned pillboxes in the rear which had
been bypassed by the advance units during darkness. The enemy artillery and mortar barrage,
directed against the crossing site and the entire bridgehead, which was to last for the next sixteen
days, also increased in intensity. Although this operation was not the costliest in battle
casualties, it was certainly the most trying from the standpoint of human suffering and mental
anguish. As during the Moselle crossing, nature had not befriended the attacking infantrymen.
Heavy rains turned the eastern bank of the river into a sea of mud for nearly a mile inland. The
entire area was literally studded with the enemy pillboxes and advances were not measured in
feet or yards but in the number of pillboxes taken. The supply problem was the most difficult
ever experienced by the Regiment. The idea of building a bridge across the swift stream was
abandoned after the third day because of continuous heavy enemy fire on the crossing site and
continued flooded state of the river. For many days the men lived and fought on one-third “K”
ration units daily and the only water for many came from many shell holes and ditches. The
weather remained cold and wet and losses from “trench foot” were almost unbelievably high.
The enemy began to counterattack immediately in the Regimental sector, the left flank of
the Division, in an effort to turn the flank of the bridgehead and liquidate the entire infantry
elements of the Division. In spite of the fact that the 357th was outnumbered three to one and
fighting without armor, the men held firm and took a huge toll of the fanatical Germans. Only a
handful of reinforcements was being received, and each day saw the Regimental strength become
smaller and smaller.
By the 20th, the great German counteroffensive through the Ardennes Forest, which had
begun on the 16th, was still gaining ground. It was apparent that the Germans had massed their
reserves for this, in their final offensive effort. If this thrust could be decisively crushed, the war
in the west would assume new aspects. With the left flank of the German bulge only a few
miles to the north, the Division bridgehead across the Saar had lost its strategic significance.
Consequently, on the afternoon of the twentieth, orders came to prepare to withdraw to the west
bank of the river.
During the early morning hours of the 22th, the Regiment completed its withdrawal. So
well planned and executed was this operation, that the enemy did not suspect that a withdrawal
was being effected. Counterattacks were made against a small covering shell during the night of
the withdrawal, but such stiff resistance was put up by the small group that no hint was given
that the positions were not fully occupied.
This operation was considered to be the most trying and gallant engagement ever
completed by the 357th. During the fifteen hectic days, 35 pillboxes had been destroyed, over
600 prisoners taken, and an estimated total of 2000 casualties inflicted on the enemy. Every
man in the Regiment had played his part, either in the line or by serving on the carrying parties
which had been so methodically decimated by the constant enemy shelling. Particular
commendation also goes to the men of the Anti-Tank Company and the battalion anti-tank
platoons who filled the gaps in the line during the last trying days and provided the screen for the
withdrawal.
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